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by
Boyd M. Buxton*
I am pleased to speak at your annual conference. Yet the assignment
is humbling because of the many changes that are occurring in an industry
that is so crucial to the health and nutrition of this country. It is an
industry in transition and the stakes are high for many farmers, pro-
cessors, and consumers. The long standing price support and milk order
programs are being questioned in part and in some cases in total. The
milk supply continues to come from fewer but larger dairies with more than
a little concern about the long term survival of the small family dairy
farm. Recent shifts in the geographic location of milk production and in
the location of the manufacturing industry may be of special concern for
you in the north central region--the more traditional dairy area. These
changes cast some shadows of uncertainty over what the future dairy
industry will look like.
Much of todays concern focuses on the immediate question of what to do
about high government costs and government inventories of dairy products
purchased under the price support program. Many suggestions have been
offered. The 1981 Agricultural Act lasted only a few months being replaced
by the check-off program in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1982. A
great deal of concern is now being expressed about this act. I’m not going
to discuss the current dairy situation or specifically evaluate the
al Speech before the 91st Annual Conference of Wisconsin Cheese Makers
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dairy provisions in the Omnibus Reconciliation Act or other specific propo- ,
sals. I would like to spend the time available to me to discuss four
questions:
1. Where will milk be produced in the future given the recent shifts
in the geographic location of milk production?
2. What might the dairy industry look like given the changes occurring
in farm size and production practices?
3. Is the dairy price support program in trouble because of the nature
of the program or because of what is expected of it?
4. What alternatives exist to solve the present high government cost
of purchasing dairy products that will not clear commercial
channels
Let me say from the start that I do not have the answers to these
questions. My intent is to raise them as questions and discuss some of the
issues involved.
Shifts in Location of Dairy Industry
An important change is underway that may alter the location of milk
production and, thereby, the location of manufacturing plants.
Over the last decade milk production has decreased in most north
central, central and plains states, while it has increased in many western,
1/
southern, and eastern states.— Milk that is not marketed as a fluid
beverage is used to make manufactured products such as ice cream, nonfat




considered along with the increased milk production, some major
shifts in the amount of milk used to make manufactured products
The areas with greatest gains in milk production are also becoming
more important sources of manufactured dairy products. When accounting for
lJ Lynn Stalbaum, “Milk Production Goes West ...Farm Belt Area Loses,” Hoards

















milk on a fat solids basis the traditional manufacturing area in the north
central and central areas are declining in relative importance as suppliers
for the U.S. manufactured dairy product markets.
Manufactured Dairy Productst Shifts
The percentage change in the average amount of milk equivalent used
for manufacturing was calculated for each state between two periods,
1970-71 and 1980-81. Whole milk equivalents used for manufacturing
increased 25 percent for the continental United States. Increases of more
than 25 percent occurred in most eastern, western, and southwestern states
(states shaded in Figure 1). Except for Wisconsin, most north central,
central and plains states decreased or increased less than the U.S. increase
(states not shaded in Figure 1).
Because some milk, cream, or both may move across state boundaries to
be processed, the change for individual states may be distorted. Much of
this possible distortion could be eliminated by grouping states into
regions as less milk would move across regional boundaries than across
state boundaries. For this purpose the shift was calculated for six
regions comprised of contiguous states (Figure 2 and Table 1).
The increase was about 44 percent for states in the far eastern United
States (region 5, Figure 2). Their share of U.S. total milk used for manu-
facturing increased from 18.0 to 20.6 percent over the 10 years considered.
In the southwest the increase was about 82 percent (region 6, Figure 2).
Out of a total increase of 4.6 billion pounds in this region, California
accounted for about 3.3 billion pounds. Their share of the U.S. total milk
used for manufacturing increased from 9.3 to 13.4 percent over the 10 years
considered (Table 1). The increase in whole milk equivalents used in manu-
factured dairy products was 37 percent in the northwest states (region 1,-6-
Figure 2) or slightly more than 1 billion pounds of milk. Its share of
total U.S. manufacturing market increased from 4.7 to 5.2 percent. The
increase in the Lake States was 7.0 billion pounds or 29 percent (region 3,
Figure 2). Its share of the U.S. total milk used for manufactured dairy
products increased from 39.7 to 40.9 for the ten year period.
In contrast to the above regions, the amount of milk used for manufac-
turing decreased 0.7 billion pounds in the plains and eastern mountain
states (region 2, Figure 2) and 1.3 billion pounds in the central and south
central states (region 4, Figure 2). Their share of the U.S. total
Table 1. Changes in the amount of whole milk equivalents used in manufac-
tured dairy products.
Two year average a/ Change
Region 1970-71 1980-81
---- -- -million pounds - - - - - Percent
East 10,852 15,586 4,734 44
(region 5) (18.0) (20.6)
Southwest 5,571 10,154 4,583 82
(region 6) (9.2) (13.4)
Northwest 2,851 3,898 1,047 37
(region 1) (4.7) (5.2)
Lake States 23,943 30,921 6,978 29
(region 3) (39.8) (40.9)
Plains and
Eastern Mountain 5,147 4,489 -658 -13
(region 2) (8.5) (5.9)
Central and
South Central 11,874 10,559 -1,315 -11
(region 4) (19.7) (14.0)
Total U.S. 60,238 75,606 15,367 26
(100) (100)
~/ Percent of U.S. total is in parenthesis-7-
decreased from 28.2 percent to 19.9 percent over the 10 year period con-
sidered (Table 1).
Factors Affecting the Shift
There are many factors underlying the observed shift in the location
of milk equivalent used for manufacturing dairy products. Some are factors
that directly affect supply and some are factors that directly affect fluid
consumption.
On the supply side the location of milk production can be affected





has tended to decline in much of Iowa and south central Minnesota,
by
in
because these areas are particularly well suited for crop production.
is still relatively important in southeast Minnesota and Wisconsin
the land is not as well suited to crop production as that in Iowa
or south central Minnesota. Distance to markets, transportation costs and
even urban pressures for agricultural land can be important factors in the
location of milk production. Climate and a shift to drylot feeding have
contributed to large scale dairy farms in California, Florida, and some
parts of the southwest.
On the fluid demand side population shifts and changes in incomes,
tastes, and preferences are important factors.
The price of milk affects both supply and fluid demand and, therefore,
may be a factor in the observed shift in the amount of milk equivalent used
for manufactured dairy products. Both the market price for milk on the one
hand and the cost of milk production on the other affects the profitability
of producing milk in any particular region. These are two sides of the
profit coin.-8-
Number and Sizes of Dairy Farms
Close examination of data shows a wide variation in
operation and in technology employed in milk production.
the size of dairy
The number and size of dairy farms have changed dramatically over the
past decade and varies from region to region within the continental United
States. Large drylot dairy farms with 1,000 to 2,000 cows each are common
in parts of the south from Florida to California. Such large farms are
essentially nonexistent through most of the northern states where a 150 cow
herd would be considered large. Technologies and practices employed in
dairy farming vary from the larger drylot operations to the smaller dairy
herds. Many questions arise as the structural shift continues. How effi-
cient are the large farms compared to the smaller more traditional dairy
farms? The trend in milk production mentioned above shows that the larger
farms in the south account for a larger proportion of total U.S. milk
production and manufactured products while the smaller farms in the tradi-
tional dairy areas are declining in relative importance.
Federal milk order data on milk deliveries per producer for May of
1979 are used to develop a current picture of dairy farm structure across
most of the United States.
A procedure was developed by
estimated. The average herd size
which the average herd size could be
for the largest ten percent of the pro-
ducers varies from 106 cows in the Upper Midwest order to 2,349 cows in the
southeastern Florida order. The average herd size for all producers deli-
vering milk varies from 46 cows in the Ohio Valley order to 810 cows in the
Southeastern Florida order.
The average herd size shows a marked
Herds in the southeast, south, southwest,
geographic pattern (Figure 3).


































larger than herds in the Upper Midwest and northeast regions. The largest
herds are located in the southeast and southwest. The largest ten percent
of producers accounted for about 29 percent of all milk deliveries to
federal orders.
The next largest twenty-five percent of producers (11 to 35
percentile) averaged 79 cows per farm but showed a similar geographic pat-
tern as the average herd size of the largest ten percent of producers
(Figure 4). In total these producers accounted for about 33 percent of all
milk deliveries to federal milk orders.
The next largest twenth-five percent of producers (largest thirty-six
to sixty percentile) averaged 48 cows but accounted for about 20 percent
of all milk deliveries to federal milk orders. A similar geographic
pattern also showed the largest herds being located in the southeast,
south, southwest, and northwest regions.
Although only about 65 percent of total milk produced is regulated by
federal milk orders the structural information on number and size of farms
should still provide a reasonable basis for contrasting dairy production
in various regions of the country. Only Grade A dairy farms are repre-
sented by the data which then likely would best reflect commercial dairy
production in the United States. The average herd size for the largest
ten percent of the dairy farms may be considered the current “leading edge”
of structural change.
changes will be is not
the large farms in the
However, the question of what the future structural
answered with the data. It does show, however, that
west, southwest, and southeast are becoming relati-
vely more important suppliers of milk used for manufacturing.
An interesting side note is that slightly less than 6,000 dairies
























1981--132.6 billion pounds. Although the trend is marked, the potential
for this to happen is not clear as no large scale dairies have been intro-
duced into the Upper Xidwest nor the potential for dairy expansion in the
south has not been examined. A complete analysis is complex and will
quickly raise questions about possible indirect subsidies such as the cost
of irrigation water in the more dry regions of the country. A closer exa-
mination of these issues will be made in the comparative advantage study
now underway.
The Price Support Issue
In my view the present surplus and record cost of the dairy price
support program is not a fault of the program itself but rather it is the
result of asking more of the program than it was designed to deliver. Eli-
minating the program because it has become too expensive is like junking a
car because it is going too fas’t. What is really needed is a clear under-
standing of what the program is designed to accomplish. It can’t do every-
thing without getting into trouble.
The main characteristics of the program dictate what the program can
and can’t do. Under the present program, a dairy operator is free to pro-
duce any amount of milk he or she desires at the prevailing market or sup-
port price. There are no restrictions on the amount of milk produced
either directly or as a condition for price support. This characteristic
greatly limits the program’s ability to set support prices above market
clearing levels. Decisions to set Che support price permanently above the
market clearing levels would generate chronic surpluses as supply would
consistently outstrip demand.
What does this mean? This means that, in the long-run, the support
price cannot exceed a free market level. Support prices must explicitly-13-
reflect supply and demand conditions or the market will become seriously
out of balance. In the long-run the general level of prices must be about
equal to those prices that would prevail under free markets.
In the short-run support prices can be set to avoid sharp drops in
price but still must be set below the long-run supply-demand equilibrium
level.
The purpose of this discussion is to clarify that the present program
is designed to stabilize milk prices in the short-run. It is not designed
to increase price (and farm income) above the long-run free market price.
Other approaches and programs would be needed to achieve a price level that
permanently exceeds the free market level.
Today the program, like a car, is being asked to exceed its safe




within the speed (level of support) for which it was
to adopt a different or modified program with suitable
Program objectives. The stated objectives of the dairy price support
program were specified in the Agricultural Act of 1949. They were to:
1. assure an adequate supply of milk
2. assure a level of farm income to maintain productive capacity to
meet future needs, and
3. reflect production costs
Although the objectives are good in principle they are vague and provide
little guidance in selecting a specific support price.
Economists have always had trouble with the term “adequate supply.”
This point was driven home to me during a conversation with one of my
colleagues. We were talking about how hard it was for farmers to find good-14-
reliable hired labor. I said “A shortage of hired farm labor exists.” My
colleague quickly reminded me that the shortage was only perceived. What







that the amount of hired labor desired exceeded that
price farmers were willing to pay. At higher wage rates
be available and less labor would be demanded. At some
the amount desired would equal the amount available and
would be in equilibrium. In a free market the price
equilibrium exists. In a free market there are no shor-
In this context what does it mean to set the milk support price to
assure an adequate supply? Is an adequate supply 10 percent more than
consumption needs? The present “surplus” condition is only a manifestation
that at the present level of prices dairymen in the aggregate produce more
milk than consumers are willing to consume. To assure an adequate supply
of milk really gives little guidance in establishing
price support.
An equally vague objective of the price support
the level of milk
program is to select
a milk support price that will “assure a level of farm income to maintain
productive capacity to meet future milk needs.” The implication of many
price support discussions is that, unless milk prices are supported, most
if not all, dairymen will be forced out of production which in turn will
destroy the future capacity to produce milk. Some view milk production as
an irreversible process. If the spicket is ever turned off it would be
difficult or impossible to turn it on again. The recent expansion would
suggest that this is an overstatement. Such a view, however, suggests the
entire dairy industry is dependent on milk price supports. I doubt this-15-
is the case. An, interesting question is whether the dairy industry could
survive a free market environment.
Unlike dairy, the cattle and hog producers operate without a price
support program. Recognizing that dairy is unique in many respects it is
interesting to observe how cattle and hog producers get along in a relatively
free market environment.
Both industries go through cycles of expansion and declining prices
then contraction and increasing prices. In cattle the complete cycle is
about ten years while in hogs it is about four years. When hog prices fell
a few years ago the adjustment was quite painful. I heard reports of hog
facilities being sold for 50 cents on the dollar. The very depressed
condition did not mean the demise of pork production but, as you know, hog
prices are up again following relatively large cut backs in production.
The stage is set for increaesd hog production within the next year or so.
It seems reasonable to me that dairy could survive a free market en-
vironment. There would be cycles of low prices that would result in ad-
justments but would not bankrupt all dairy farmers.
In this context, what does it mean to set milk prices to insure future
production capacity? Again the stated purpose of the price support program
is extremely vague. It gives little concrete guidance in where to set the
support price for milk.
In the long-run milk prices must reflect costs of production. However,
calculating a cost of production as a guide in setting the support price is
a very imprecise process. Too many arbitrary assumptions are involved in
cost calculations to accurately reflect the above long-run free market
price. Whether parity prices or cost of production estimates are used as a
basis for setting price supports the bottom line still comes back to the
long-run free market price needed to balance SUpply and demand.-16-
In the context of the present program
when supply exceeds demand is probably the
and the pressure to reduce prices
best criterion for price support
adjustments. This means that flexibility to adjust prices in a timely
manner according to changes in supply and demand conditions works best with
the present program.
The 1977 farm bill reduced the flexibility of the Secretary of Agri-
culture to adjust prices down as surpluses began growing. Now we are at
the cross-roads. A decision must be made whe~her a new program is needed
so that the support price can be maintained above the long-run free market
level or to make downward adjustments in the support price within the
design of the present program.
What Can Be Done?
The present emphasis in Washington on cutting costs coincides with
the rapid increase in costs of the dairy support program. This raises the
question of what can be done to reduce government costs and still minimize
the impact on the dairy industry.
Several alternative solutions have been suggested, including a reduc-
tion in imports, an increase in exports, and expansion of domestic consump-
tion through promotion and advertising. These alternatives would be
relatively painless for the dairy industry
tion in the support price or impose supply
would they be?
Reduce Imports
as they would not require reduc-
controls. But how effective
Some observers believe the solution to the dairy program is to tighten
import controls even further.-17-
Import quotas for dairy products into the United States are presently
set at 2.23 billion pounds of milk equivalent, or about 1.7 percent of total
domestic production. In addition casein, which is not under quota, is being
imported (152 million pounds in 1980). Although some of the casein is used
for industrial products, some has
replaced some commercial sales of
To the extent that casein is
been used in food products and thus has
nonfat dry milk.
substituted for nonfat dry milk in food
products, imports of casein directly affect the cost of operating the
dairy price support program. A recent report concluded that cutting casein
imports in half by imposing a 50 percent quota would reduce CCC purchases
2/
of nonfat dry milk about 10 million pounds or $9.3 million.— A 50 per-
cent tariff that increased the price of casein 60 cents a pound would have
no impact on the cost of the price support program.
The government is expected to remove 13.7 billion pounds of milk
equivalent from commercial channels for the October 1981 to September 1982
period. This greatly exceeds the potential 2.23 billion pounds of imports
plus the nonfat dry milk replaced by casein imports. In addition, eliminat-
ing import quotas would not automatically result in an additional demand
for 2.23 billion pounds of domestic milk. Part of the imports undoubtedly
reflects a demand for specific foreign cheeses such as Danish blue and
other varieties which United States-made cheese may not fulfill.
Eliminating import quotas and restricting casein imports would help
reduce the government cost of operating the present dairy price support
program. However, it would do so by only a fraction of current program
cost, and would be far short of bringing the sector into balance.
2_/ USDA “U.S. Casein and Lactalbumin Imports: An Economic and Policy
Perspective, *’Economics and Statistics Service, USDA, ESS Staff Report No.
AGESS 810521.-18-
Increased Exports
World supply and demand situations generally put limits on the
potential export of United States dairy products. Surpluses in Europe,
New Zealand, and Australia make it difficult to expand exports without
using export subsidies or disrupting United States trade relationships.
Foreign donations continue to provide a place to ship some nonfat dry milk,
but proposed budget cuts for Public Law 480 make it unlikely that this
export possibility will be realized. Even if the budget for PL 480 were
increased, it is not likely
to reverse the imbalance in
Expand Domestic Consumption
that that program could accomplish very much
the dairy industry.
Civilian consumption has increased about
1975 but recently has bee n about double that
this same time period has increased about two
1 percent per year since .
rate. Milk production, over
percent per year and
outstripped the normal growth in civilian consumption with government
removals amounting to about 10 percent of production. The potential for
promotion to sell surplus seems remote. The Omnibus Reconciliation Act
excluded any promotion provisions.
More Painful Solutions
Direct payments or supply control are two policy alternatives that
could reduce government purchases, but generally neither policy is pre-
ferred by the United States dairy industry or the present Administration.
Direct payments would allow retail prices to decline, reducing or elimi-
nating the need for government purchases and permitting products to be
sold commercially. However, the total government cost for payments withsuch a program would
compound the present
-19-
increase dramatically. Such increases would only
federal budget problems.
Yet, supply control would be difficult to administer. Many administr-
ativequestions such as how to establish a farmer’s quota and how to allow
for resource adjustments and new entrants into dairy farming would exist.
Another nonprice program would be to provide payment incentives for
farmers to cull dairy cows. This type of program could help bring about
the needed adjustment, but again would be difficult to administer and could
be expensive. Payments would probably be made for many cows that would
normally be culled (about 25 percent of all milk cows are culled each year).
The only remaining alternative is to lower the level of the support
price. Of course this alternative would be of most concern to dairy
farmers for it would reduce their income. Prior to 1977 it has always
been possible to bring supply into balance with demand with a minimum
support price of 75 percent of parity. This may not be true today with
unusually low feed prices and relatively poor alternatives to dairy.
The legislation just signed is a program that effectively reduces the
farm milk price. However, consumer prices will remain at the higher sup-
port level and, thereby, fail to encourage additional consumption. The
possible refund of the second 50 cent reduction is to depend on whether a
farmer reduces his milk production. This is a departure from the past as
it in effect institutes a program whose support is tied to reductions in
milk produced. The deduction would be able to raise enough revenue so
direct government costs to purchase surplus dairy products could be signifi-
cantly reduced. The reduction in government cost would exceed the reduction
associated with a 50 cent lower support price.
A reduction in support price provides incentive to both consumers and
producers to make the needed adjustment. This spreads the burden of-20-
adjustment, and brings it about on as broad a scale as possible without
imposing undue hardship on particular groups. What is often forgotten
is that allowing prices to provide the incentive for adjustment works on
both sides of the market. Lower prices, for example, encourage increased
consumption as well as reduced production. Because of this double effect,
prices often do not have to decline as much as the overt surplus would
suggest. Higher prices associated with high levels of support would
encourage the shift to alternative products and development of dairy
product substitutes.
Summary
Many changes are occuring in the location of milk production and
the source of milk used to ~ke manufactured dairy products. Technology,
production practices and herd sizes va~y considerably from one region of
the country to another. These changes have given rise to questions about
whether or not the traditional dairy area in the Upper Midwest still has
a comparative advantage in milk production.
Dairy is at a crossroad with the price support program. In order to
pursue the long-run objective of increasing dairy farm income above the
equilibrium levels, major modifications of the present price support
program will be needed if large government costs are to be avoided. The
price support program was designed primarily to stabilize milk prices and
not to increase dairy farm income.